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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee/
Respondent,
v.
Case No. 950521-CA
BRYAN 0. RASMUSSEN,
Defendant/Appellant/
Petitioner.

INTRODUCTION
Appellant/Petitioner,

Bryan

O.

Rasmussen,

files

this

Petition for Rehearing pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1

PROVISIONS

(1995) provides:

76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or muie JIPIHOIJS
-- Enhanced penalties.
(1)
(a) A person who commits any offense listed in
Subsection (4) in concert with two or more persons
is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense
as provided below.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used
in this section means the defendant and two or more
other persons would be criminally liable for the
offense as parties under Section 76-2-202.
(2)
(a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if
an indictment is returned, shall cause to be
subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases
or the information or indictment in felony cases
notice that the defendant
is subject to the
enhanced penalties provided under this section.
The notice shall be in a clause separate from and
in addition to the substantive offense charged.
(b)
If
the
subscription
is
not
included
initially, the court may subsequently allow the
prosecutor to amend the charging document
to
include the subscription if the court finds the
charging documents, including any statement of
probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of

the allegation he committed the offense in concert
with two or more persons, or if the court finds the
defendant has not otherwise been substantially
prejudiced by the omission.
(3)
The enhanced penalties for offenses committed
under this section are:
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the
convicted person shall serve a minimum term of 90
consecutive
days
in a jail
or other
secure
correctional facility.
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the
convicted person shall serve a minimum term of 180
consecutive
days
in a
jail
or
other
secure
correctional facility.
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced
minimum term of three years in prison.
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced
minimum term of six years in prison.
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced
minimum term of nine years in prison.
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which
a life sentence is imposed, the convicted person
shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 2 0 years in
prison.
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are:
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter
37,
37a, 37b, or 37c, regarding
drug-related
offenses;
(b) assault and related offenses under' Title 76,
Chapter 5, Part 1;
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76,
Chapter 5, Part 2;
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title
76, Chapter 5, Part 3;
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76,
Chapter 5, Part 4;
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in
Section 76-5a-3;
(g) any property destruction offense under Title
76, Chapter 6, Part 1;
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related
offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2;
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title
76, Chapter 6, Part 3;
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76,
Chapter 6, Part 4;
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6,
Part
5,
except
Sections
76-6-503,
76-6-504,
76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510,
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76-6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516,
76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 76-6-520;
(I) any offense of obstructing
government
operations under Part 3, Title 76, Chapter 8,
except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304,
76-8-307, 76-8-308, and 76-8-312;
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation
of Section 76-8-508;
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal
proceeding as defined in Section 76-8-509;
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76,
Chapter 10, Part 3;
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter
10, Part 5;
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and
performances offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10,
Part 12;
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title
76, Chapter 10, Part 13;
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part
15, Bus Passenger Safety Act;
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part
16, Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act;
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section
76-10-1801;
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part
19, Money Laundering and Currency Transaction
Reporting Act; and
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in
Section 76-10-2002.
(5)
(a)
This section does not create any separate
offense but provides an enhanced penalty for the
primary offense.
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced
penalties under this section that the persons with
whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert
are
not
identified,
apprehended,
charged,
or
convicted, or that any of those persons are charged
with or convicted of a different or lesser offense.
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury
shall decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty
under this section. The imposition of the penalty
is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing
judge
that
this
section
is
applicable.
In
conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter
written
findings
of
fact
concerning
the
applicability of this section.
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution
of the sentence required under this section if the court:
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be
best served; and

3

(b) states the specific circumstances justifying
the disposition on the record and in writing.

The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

The

fourteenth

amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution provides:
Section 1. [Citizenship -- Due process of law -- Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of las; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.

Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 7.

[Due process of law.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
4

ISSUES OF LAW WHICH NEED TO BE READDRESSED
1.
entitled

The opinion incorrectly holds that the State is

to a second

sentencing hearing where

it may

present

evidence that it voluntarily declined to submit at the initial
sentencing hearing, rather than merely remanding for findings based
on the record already created.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE STATE FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN AT
SENTENCING OF PROVING BY A PREPONDERANCE OF
THE EVIDENCE THAT MR. RASMUSSEN ACTED IN
CONCERT WITH TWO OR MORE OTHERS, AND IS NOT
ENTITLED TO A SUCCESSIVE EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
In its opinion, attached as addendum A, this Court found
that the trial court failed to make written findings concerning the
applicability of the gang enhancement as required by Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-203.1(5)(c) (1995).

However, rather than remanding for the

limited purpose of allowing the trial court to make findings based
on the record already created, this Court remanded for a complete
evidentiary

hearing

in

addition

to

requesting

the

necessary

findings.
There is nothing in the sentencing hearing transcript
that indicates that the State was precluded from introducing any
evidence it may have desired on the issue of gang enhancement
applicability.

R. 109 ("THE COURT:

anything to add in this matter?"

Mr. Gunnarson, the state have

The State added a few comments,

but did not call or attempt to call any witnesses) . The State had
its opportunity, but declined to present any witnesses or other
5

evidence at the sentencing hearing.

The State should be bound by

the evidentiary record it created at the sentencing hearing on
August 4, 1995.
11

[A] defendant is entitled to due process protections

during sentencing to prevent procedural unfairness."

State v.

Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 854-5 (Utah 1994) (citing State v. Bell, 754
P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1988), and State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007
(Utah 1982)).

As a matter of both due process and simple logic,

the factual predicate for a sentence needs to be fully developed
before that sentence may properly be imposed.

Because a proper

factual predicate was not developed here, the enhanced sentence may
not be imposed.
State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894

(Utah App. 1993) is

controlling on the issue of remands for successive
hearings.

Gutierrez

involved

an appeal

of

the

evidentiary

trial

court's

refusal to suppress a confession taken in violation of Miranda.

On

appeal, the State requested a remand for an evidentiary hearing.
This Court agreed with defendant that the authority relied upon by
the State did not support a remand for an evidentiary hearing.
P. 2d at 903.

864

This Court1 wrote:

In contrast to Willett [ v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 863
(Utah 1992)] and FState v. 1 Strain, [779 P.2d 221, 227
(Utah 1989) ,] the trial court in this case directly ruled
on the suppression issue, basing its ruling on all the
evidence the State elected to submit, and this court has
a complete transcript of the evidence submitted and the
hearing at which that evidence was considered."

x

The Gutierrez opinion was authored by Judge Greenwood, with
Judges Billings and Garff concurring.
6

Having concluded that remanding this case would
give the State an unprecedented opportunity to bolster or
modify the prosecution's original argument, taking
advantage of a retrospective critique by the State, we
find no legal basis for the remand requested by the
State." Furthermore, remand as requested by the State
would not be sound judicial policy, as it would permit
successive attempts to introduce evidence overlooked in
prior hearings, thus preventing final conclusion of these
proceedings.
Therefore, we conclude that the State's
request for a remand of this case is both legally and
factually untenable.
Gutierrez, 864 P.2d at 903.
The same result should pertain here.

The trial court

here ruled, imposing gang enhancements, "basing its ruling on all
the evidence the State elected to submit, and this court has a
complete transcript of the evidence submitted and the hearing at
which that evidence was considered."
Other case law is in accord. Cases discussing inadequate
findings have not remanded for new evidentiary hearings.

E.g. In

re Estate of Ouinn, 830 P.2d 282, 286 (Utah App. 1992) :
Unless the record clearly and uncontrovertedly supports
the trial court's decision, the absence of adequate
findings of fact precludes appellate review of the
evidentiary basis underlying the trial court's decision
and requires remand for more detailed findings by the
trial court.
See Woodwardrv. Fazziol, 823 P.2d [474,]
478-479 [(Utah App. 1991)]; State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d
767, 770-71 (Utah App. 1990).
Only where the trial court has denied a full and fair
opportunity to be heard is an evidentiary remand appropriate.

E.g.

State v. Starnes, 841 P. 2d 712, 716 (Utah App. 1992) ("Inasmuch as
we conclude that Starnes was not afforded a 'full hearing' as
required by statute, we vacate the restitution judgment entered and

7

remand for a full evidentiary hearing wherein Starnes can introduce
his evidence.").
Here, at most the State is entitled only to a limited
remand to allow the trial court to enter findings supporting the
imposition

of

the gang

previously adduced.2

enhancement, premised

on

the

evidence

This Court should rehear this case and vacate

that portion of its memorandum decision granting the State an
evidentiary hearing.

POINT

11 .
BECAUSE THE RECORD HERE IS LEGALLY
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT IMPOSITION OF GANG
ENHANCEMENTS ON MR. RASMUSSEN, THIS COURT MAY
VACATE THE GANG ENHANCEMENTS WITHOUT ORDERING
A REMAND FOR ENTRY OF FINDINGS.

Where the record is sufficiently complete and clear,
remand for factual findings is unnecessary and this Court may rule
directly on the pertinent issue:
Although the trial court did not make any findings as to
the purpose or flagrancy of the officers' behavior, the
record is sufficient for us to make this determination.
See Sims v. Collection Div. of the State Tax Comm'n, 841
P.2d 6, 10 (1992); State v. Small, 829 P.2d 129, 130-32
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699,
704 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1273 (Utah 1993).

2

Because there is no evidence in the record on which such a
finding could possibly be premised, see Mr. Rasmussen's reply brief
at 6-12 (attached as addendum B ) , it would make sense to grant the
trial court further authority to vacate imposition of the gang
enhancement. Requiring the trial court to admit that there is no
evidence supporting imposition of the gang enhancement, and waiting
for an appeal from that finding before the enhancements may
actually be vacated, is decidedly inefficient.
8

Here, there is no evidence supporting imposition of the
gang

enhancement.

See

attached as addendum B.

Mr. Rasmussen's

reply

brief

at

6-12,

As a matter of judicial economy, this

Court should vacate the gang enhancements imposed, rather than
requiring the unnecessary intermediate step of requiring the trial
court to make factual findings.

CONCLUSION
This case should be reheard.

The State is not entitled

to another sentencing hearing to present evidence it should have
presented before.

At most the State is entitled to remand for

entry of factual findings. Because the record here is sufficiently
clear, and there is no evidence to support imposition of the gang
enhancements, this Court may vacate the enhancements directly.
As set forth in Rule 40(a), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, counsel's signature below operates as a certificate that
this pleading is offered in good faith and not for any improper
purpose, including but not limited to delay.
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

See Rule 35, Utah

^/

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

T

day of November, 1996.

^f^W-—

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner

JUDITH A. JENSEN
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner
9

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
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day of

November, 1996.

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN

DELIVERED/MAILED this

day of November, 1996.
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ADDENDUM A
Opinion in State v. Rasmussen, No. 950521-CA (Utah App.
October 24, 1996) .

FILED
OCr 2<M996
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

_a.

COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

State of Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 950521-CA

Bryan 0. Rasmussen,
Defendant and Appellant,

F I L E D
(October 24, 1996)

Third District, Salt Lake Department, Division I
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
Attorneys:

Robert K. Heineman and Judith A. Jensen, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
Jan Graham and J. Kevin Murphy, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before Judges Orme, Billings, and Greenwood.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Bryan Rasmussen challenges the constitutionality of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) on federal and state constitutional
grounds. A recent decision of the Utah Supreme Court, State v.
LflbruiD/ 293 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (1996), mandates that we remand
this case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing and entry
of findings, and precludes us from addressing the constitutional
issues raised by defendant.
In sentencing defendant after acceptance of his guilty plea,
the trial court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, nor did
it enter findings of fact supporting imposition of the section
76-3-203.1 gang enhancement sentence. The State has requested
that we remand this case for an evidentiary hearing and entry of
findings
in accord with section 76-3-2-3.1, which requires that
lf
[i]n conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter written
findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (5) (c) (1995).
After the briefs were filed in this case, but before oral
argument, the Utah Supreme Court issued Labrum. which
specifically addressed whether a trial court must make findings
in support of the imposition of section 76-3-203.1. The Labrum

court held that the trial court committed plain error because "no
specific finding was entered with respect to the complicity of
the other two persons who accompanied" the defendant, Labrum.
293 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21. Because the error was both plain and
prejudicial, it was not waived by failure of the defendant to
enter a timely objection. Id. We agree with the State that
under Labrum the trial courtfs failure in this case to enter
findings in support of the imposition of the section 76-3-203.1
sentence enhancement was plain error. Accordingly, we must
remand.
Furthermore, without comment on the merits of the argument,
a remand to determine whether defendant acted "in concert" under
section 76-3-203.1 is appropriate even in the absence of Labrum.
The State contends that defendant admitted to acting "in concert"
with others and raises only a facial challenge to the statute.
The State argues defendant cannot raise an as-applied
constitutional challenge and is therefore also precluded from
raising a facial constitutional challenge. See State v. Mace,
921 P.2d 13 72, 13 79 (Utah 1996) (holding that defendant did not
have standing to raise facial constitutional challenge where
statute did not apply to his factual circumstances). Defendant
disputes the State's position, arguing that he did not admit that
section 76-3-203.1 was constitutional as applied to his
circumstances. After review, we believe the record is unclear on
this issue, and therefore an evidentiary hearing and entry of
findings is doubly appropriate.
Consequently, as in Labrum. we "remand to the trial court
for further proceedings in compliance with [section] 76-3-203.1.n
Labrumr 293 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21. Upon remand, the trial court
should hold an evidentiary hearing on the factual circumstances
which support the imposition of section 76-3-203.1, and enter
appropriate findings.

^

7~

Greenwood, Judge

WE CONCUR:
-4-

udith M. Billings, Judge

Gregory K>r Orme,
Presiding Judge

950521-CA

ADDENDUM B
Excerpt

from Mr. Rasmussen's

reply brief, pp.

6-12,

addressing lack of any evidence to support imposition of the gang
enhancements.

examination be waived by the accused with the consent
of the State, or by indictment, with or without such
examination and commitment. The formation of the grand
jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as
prescribed by the Legislature.

Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution
provides:
Sec. 24.

[Uniform operation of laws.]

All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO
SUPPORT IMPOSITION OF THE GANG ENHANCEMENT
HERE.
(Responding to State's brief at Statement of Facts
at p. 5; Point I.B. (pp. 11-13); Point I.D.
at p. 16; Point III.B. at p. 27)
MR. RASMUSSEN1 S ADMISSION THAT HE ACTED
"AS A PARTY TO THE OFFENSE" IS NOT AN
ADMISSION THAT HE ACTED "IN CONCERT WITH
TWO OR MORE PERSONS."

A.

The State asserts that "[w]hen he pleaded guilty,
Rasmussen admitted that he acted

f

as a party to1 the offenses (R.

43-45, 94-96), thereby admitting the factual predicate for the
section 76-3-203.1
Appellee at 5.

f

in concert1 sentence enhancement."

Br.

Mr. Rasmussen did in fact admit that he acted "as

a party to" the offenses.

However, this language merely tracks

the usual formulation of charging informations.

E.g. State v.

Abevta, 852 P.2d 993, 994 (Utah 1993) ("Ricky Brad Abeyta, a
party to the offense . . . " ) ; State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146, 153
6

(Utah 1989) ("GARY CHARLES TRIPTOW, a party to the offense
. . . " ) ; State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 135 (Utah App. 1989)
("James Jamison, a party to the offense . . . " ) .
43-45 and 94-96 are attached as Addendum A.

Copies of R.

Nowhere is there any

admission that Mr. Rasmussen committed the crimes "in concert
with two or more persons."
Mr. Rasmussen!s pleas of guilty only admitted the
underlying offenses, and said nothing about what sentences and
possible enhancements would be applicable.1

Mr. Rasmussen

admitted nothing beyond the fact that he, individually, committed
the underlying offenses.

Section 76-3-203.1 requires a finding

by the sentencing judge that the defendant committed the crime
"in concert with two or more persons."

Here, there was no

evidence from which the trial court could reasonably make that
finding.
The State f s contention that Mr. Rasmussenfs guilty
pleas to only the underlying offenses also constitute an
admission that the gang enhancement is applicable contradicts its
entire argument in this case.

Mr. Rasmussen contends that "in

concert" activity is a separate element of a newly defined
aggravated crime, and should be proven at trial with all the
attendant due process protections, including the right to a
unanimous jury determination by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Br. Appellant, Point I (pp. 11-23).
x

The State has steadfastly

It is, of course, permissible for a defendant to admit the
factual predicate for any enhancement, but this did not occur in
the case at bar.
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opposed this contention.

Memorandum Supporting the

Constitutionality of Gang Enhancement Statute, R. 29-38 at 34
("Sentencing under U.C.A. § 76-3-203.1 includes the determination
that the defendant committed the criminal act in concert with two
or more persons.").

Mr. Rasmussen's pleas to the underlying

offenses alone can only constitute an admission of the in concert
activity if in concert activity is an element.

If, as the State

has argued, it is merely a sentencing consideration, then the
plea to the underlying offense, by itself, cannot be an admission
that the sentencing enhancement is applicable.
The State cannot have it both ways.

If the in concert

activity is a necessary element of a new offense, Mr. Rasmussen's
motion should have been granted and he prevails here.

If not,

then his pleas to only the underlying offenses are insufficient
to support application of the enhanced sentence, and the
enhancements must be vacated.
B.

TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT CONCEDE THAT THE
GANG ENHANCEMENT WAS PROPERLY
APPLICABLE.

The State further asserts that Mr. Rasmussen "agreed"
that the enhancement was applicable, citing to R. 105. Br.
Appellee at 11. The page referenced by the State concerned the
degree of the enhancement, if any, that was applicable in light
of the fact that the theft charges, which were originally 2nd
degree felonies, were reduced to 3rd degree felonies as a result
of the legislature's amendment of the offense level
classifications in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1995)
8

(effective May 1, 1995) .

See R. 57-8 (motion and stipulation to

reduce category of offense), 59 (order).
Defense counsel did not agree that any enhancement
should be imposed.

The plea agreement does not indicate that any

such admission was part of the bargain.

Absent any such

agreement as part of the plea bargain, defense counsel would
violate his or her duty of loyalty and zealous representation by
asserting that the client should receive a harsher sentence.
State v. Holland, 281 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6 (Utah 1996).
C.

THE GANG ENHANCEMENT HERE WAS APPLIED IN
A PERFUNCTORY MANNER, WITH NO EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT ITS APPLICATION.

The State asserts that " [b]ecause Rasmussen never
submitted the

f

in concert1 issue and the intent of his co-

perpetrators to any adversarial testing, he cannot complain that
the issue would have been perfunctorily decided, or too
complicated for the trial court to decide, in his case."
Appellee at 11-12.

Br.

This proposition rests on the incorrect

notion that Mr. Rasmussen either admitted he acted in concert, or
stipulated that the enhancement could be applied to him.

To the

contrary, no such admissions or stipulations are contained in the
record.
Mr. Rasmussen appeared at sentencing, represented by
counsel, and the matter of his sentence was subjected to
adversarial testing.

See August 4, 1995 Reporter's Transcript of

Sentencing Proceedings, R. 103-112.

For whatever reason, the

State put on no evidence concerning any codefendants or uncharged
9

other actors, their actions, or their mental states.

R. 109.

The trial court's findings fail to identify any such other
actors, what their involvement was, or the nature of their
criminal mens rea.

Based on the dearth of evidence before the

trial court, no such findings could be made.
The sum total of what was before the judge concerning
in concert activity consists of the bare allegations of the
information, R. 7-11.

The information, sworn to by Det. J. W.

Prior, asserts:
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Agent Jeff
Sarnacki will testify that on December 17, 1994, he
interviewed defendant Cheeney. After being informed of
his constitutional rights and freely agreeing to speak
without an attorney present, defendant Cheeney admitted
to all of the above conduct and that defendant
Rasmussen had been involved with him. Defendant
Cheeney also admitted that defendant Hoffman was
involved in all but the Sundance Institute burglary and
theft.
R. 11.

Criminal informations are not evidence.

If they were,

there would be little need for preliminary hearings:

the

information could be used to establish by a preponderance all of
the allegations.

See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1228 (Utah

1995) (probable cause standard is lower than preponderance
standard).
Additionally, the information suffers from multiple
hearsay problems.

Det. Prior is reporting concerning information

relayed to him by unknown means concerning statements allegedly
made by co-defendant Cheeney to ATF agent Sarnacki.

This

information is at best triple hearsay, and as a matter of due
process is insufficiently reliable to be relied on at sentencing.
10

State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993) ("Although
hearsay evidence can be admissible in a sentencing proceeding,
double hearsay is so inherently unreliable and presents such a
high probability for inaccuracy that it cannot stand alone as the
basis for sentencing.").

Bruton problems are likewise palpable:

the information relies entirely on the confession of a codefendant.

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 125, 88 S.Ct.

1620, 1622, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (U.S. 1968) (admission of codefendant's confession at joint trial violated sixth amendment
right to confrontation and cross-examination) .
Fully marshalled, there is insufficient evidence to
support imposition of the gang enhancements here.

Even though

Christopher Cheeney pleaded guilty to the Sundance Institute
counts on September 8, 1995, this was more than a month after Mr.
Rasmussen!s sentence was imposed.

See Statement of Defendant,

Certificate of Counsel, and Order for Mr. Cheeney, R. 27-36 in
Case No. 950720-CA, attached as Addendum B.

Even if the court

could somehow take judicial notice of future events,2 the State
would still be one actor short of showing action "in concert with
two or more persons" on that charge.

Appropriately, no gang

enhancement was applied to Mr. Rasmussen on the Sundance
Institute counts.

Mr. Cheeney did not plead guilty to any of the

three remaining counts, for which Mr. Rasmussen did receive gang
enhancements.

2

This premise is, of course, patently absurd.
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The gang enhancement in this case was applied in a most
perfunctory manner, based on nothing more than the bare
allegations of the charging information.
violated.

Due process has been

The gang enhancements imposed must be vacated.

POINT II. UNDER McMILLAN. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT
EXCEEDS THE FEDERAL DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS
OF OFFENSE DEFINITION AS THE TAIL (THE GANG
ENHANCEMENT) IS WAGGING THE DOG (THE
UNDERLYING OFFENSE) .
(Responding to State's Brief at Point I.D. (pp.
15-17)
Under McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct.
2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), the legislature's designation of "in
concert" activity as a sentencing consideration rather than a
substantive element violates due process. As explained earlier,
the State's contention that Mr. Rasmussen never "demanded a
factfinding procedure of any nature, by jury or otherwise," Br.
Appellee at 16, is not well taken.

First, Mr. Rasmussen

requested that the trial court hold that the issue of "in
concert" activity should be decided by a jury at trial.

R. 25-6.

Mr. Rasmussen did not waive sentencing; the State was required to
establish a factual predicate for the application of the gang
enhancement at the sentencing hearing.

Having failed to do so,

the enhancement is not applicable.
The State's contention that Mr. Rasmussen cites no
authority, Br. Appellee at 16, is frivolous. McMillan is cited
repeatedly, Br. Appellant at 13-15, 18, 19, and mandates that the
statutory scheme here be held unconstitutional.
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